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Correct Global Imbalances?
by Terry McKinley, Director, CDPR, SOAS
Many commentators in the West have jumped on the bandwagon 
lately to blame China for playing a leading role in causing the cur-
rent global crisis, as well as for preventing a sustainable recovery. 
The criticisms often focus on what a prominent U.S. government 
representative has recently called ‘exchange-rate manipulation’. 
Since Martin Wolf, the well-known columnist of the Financial 
Times, has been noteworthy for lodging such criticisms of China, 
we begin our discussion with some of his remarks. Over the course 
of a series of columns starting in December 2008 as well as in his 
book (Wolf 2009), he has laid out a case for pinning the principal 
blame on China for global imbalances. 
For example, in his representative column on January 20, 2009, 
he states that the global crisis is due to “the malign interaction 
between some countries’ propensity towards chronic excess supply 
and other countries’ opposite propensity towards excess demand” 
and stresses that “…the driving force behind these [global] ‘imbal-
ances’ has been the policies of surplus countries and particularly 
China…”. 
Focusing more on the prospects of global recovery in his April 7 
column (entitled tellingly “What the G2 Must Discuss Now the 
G20 Is Over”), he notes that “China must also understand an es-
sential point: the world cannot safely absorb the current account 
surpluses it is likely to generate under its current development 
path”.
In contrast to such an analysis, this Policy Brief argues that the 
main source of global instability is to be found in the US, the 
world’s economically dominant, reserve-currency country—and 
its most profligate. The Brief also maintains that what is now most 
problematic is certainly not the current policy response of China to 
the crisis, but the difficulties faced by the US in correcting its own 
imbalances. 
The US is currently trying to replace huge private-sector deficits 
(which were grossly inflated by the domestically generated stock-
market and housing bubbles) with massive public deficits. Its fiscal 
deficit for 2009 is projected, for example, to reach about 13% of 
GDP. 
However, such a fiscal effort will certainly not help correct the 
US’s mammoth current-account deficits since it will surely boost 
imports. Only a precipitous decline in the US dollar could produce 
the necessary correction of the current account. 
In recent weeks, the dollar’s value has been in decline. But could 
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the global economy afford a sharp drop of its chief reserve cur-
rency? Not likely, in part because many other currencies would be 
significantly appreciated in the process. 
In recent years, even before the current crisis, the value of the US 
dollar was trending downwards. For example, between its high 
point in February 2002 and its low point in April 2008, the Fed’s 
nominal broad dollar index fell by about 26%. 
But between April 2008 and April 2009, the dollar appreciated, as 
the Fed index rose again by 15%. Despite the crisis (and despite 
low returns), foreign investors flocked during this period to US 
Treasury Securities as a ‘safe haven’. Foreign governments have 
been the chief purchasers of these securities but private investors 
have not been far behind.
Now, in June 2009, the dollar is heading downwards again, in 
response apparently to the first glimmers of eventual economic 
recovery. Depreciation could certainly benefit the US since it en-
joys the privilege of borrowing internationally in its own currency. 
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it is most needed (see McKinley 2006 for any early exposition of 
this problem).
As Table 1 highlights, the significant increase in savings in 
‘Emerging and Developing Economies’ was due mainly to the in-
creases in the Middle East and Developing Asia (including China). 
The former region has enjoyed the windfall of rising oil prices 
while the latter has been successful in achieving export-led growth. 
 
Export-Led Surpluses 
Countries adopting an export-led model are more likely, if suc-
cessful, to run current-account surpluses. There is nothing malign 
about choosing such a strategy. Japan and Germany remain promi-
nent examples. During 2006-2008, the former’s current-account 
surplus averaged 4% of GDP while the latter’s averaged 6.7%. The 
East Asian Tigers, such as Singapore and Taiwan POC, have also 
followed this path with great success, emulating Japan’s earlier 
example. 
Only recently has China also begun to run large current-account 
surpluses. During 2006-2008, its average surplus was about 10% 
of GDP, which is indeed high for such a large economy. But as 
recently as 2001-2003, this average had been only about 2%. 
Until the mid 2000s, there appears to be no notable correlation 
between the size of China’s current-account surplus and that of the 
US’s current-account deficit. Figure 1, which charts the current-
account trend of China against that of the US, shows that there is 
little meaningful connection between the two until very recently. 
The US’s tendency to run sizeable current-account deficits dates 
from the early 1990s, when China’s current-account surpluses 
were still negligible. In other words, the US’s propensity to ‘live 
beyond its means’ was well entrenched long before China became 
a significant exporter of capital. 
Moreover, the structure of China’s trade has been undergoing 
significant change during the 2000s. In 2000, about one third of 
China’s exports went to Developing Asia, about 53% went to the 
US, Japan and the European Union and the remaining 14% went to 
‘Other Countries’. 
However, by 2007, while the share of China’s exports to Develop-
ing Asia remained roughly the same, its share going to the US, 
Japan and the European Union dropped by 15 percentage points 
to about 38% while its share going to ‘Other Countries’ rose to 
almost 29%. 
The share of China’s exports shipped to the US declined from 
about 20% in 2000 to about 16% in 2007 (Asian Development 
Outlook 2009, Table A11). This being the case, the Chinese policy 
of pegging its renminbi to the dollar does not make a great deal of 
sense—nor does pumping reserves into US securities in order to 
abate depreciation of the dollar. China is bound to abandon such an 
increasingly ineffective and risky strategy, and appears already to 
have taken steps to do so.
China’s Development Model
As a result of the debate on its exchange-rate policies, China’s 
development model has lately been subjected to considerable criti-
cism from commentators in the West. However, in many respects 
its remarkable success speaks for itself. For example, while in 
1980 China’s GDP per capita was only $ 807, by 2008 this meas-
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Hence, depreciation would reduce the value of US net foreign 
liabilities in the process. 
In contrast, the governments that hold US Treasury Securities, 
China being prominent among them, would suffer from a ‘devalu-
ation’ of their foreign assets. And if these governments tried to 
move their investments to other currencies, the dollar deprecia-
tion would accelerate and US interest rates would have to rise in 
response—precisely at a time when they should remain low to 
support recovery.
A Global Savings Glut?
The underlying cause of global imbalances has been a US ‘over-
consumption’ binge—certainly not China’s management of its 
exchange rate or its high savings rate.  However, one of the major 
claims of critics of China is that by recently running enormous 
current-account surpluses, China is contributing to a ‘global sav-
ings glut’ (See Wolf 2009, p. 58). Since this mantra appears to 
cut across the spectrum of economists, from Martin Wolf to Ben 
Bernanke to Lawrence Summers, it merits closer examination.
Although widely accepted, does such a claim make sense? At the 
global level, it does not: global savings must equal, by definition, 
global investment (unless there are errors in estimation). Excess 
savings in one grouping of countries, such as Asia, must be bal-
anced out by deficient savings in another part of the world, such 
as the US.
Perhaps the China critics mean by ‘glut’ that global savings have 
been rising relative to global income. Table 1 shows that broad 
averages do not support such a claim. During 1986-1993, world 
savings as a ratio to world income was 22.7% while during 1994-
2001 this ratio slipped to 22.1%.  In the most recent period for 
which the IMF has data, namely, 2002-2008, the global savings 
ratio rose back up to 22.7%. This is, indeed, very weak evidence 
of a ‘global savings glut’.
In the so-called ‘Advanced Economies’, the ratio of savings to 
GDP has, in fact, been falling since the late 1980s. While it was 
22.2% during 1986-1993, it dropped to 19.8% during 2002-2008. 
The global savings ratio has managed to remain fairly constant 
only because the savings ratio in ‘Emerging and Developing 
Economies’ increased from 24.2% during 1994-2001 to 31.1% 
during 2002-2008. 
As a result, these low- and middle-income countries have ended 
up exporting huge quantities of capital to the richest countries, 
predominantly the US. In other words, capital is ‘flowing uphill’ 
from poorer countries to richer countries, instead of staying where 
Source: ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2009; and IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 2009.
1986-1993 1994-2001 2002-2008
Global  22.7 22.1 22.7
  Advanced Economies 22.2 21.6 19.8
      USA 16.3 17.0 13.9
  Emerging and 
  Developing Economies 24.3 24.2 31.1
      Middle East 17.6 25.5 38.7
      Developing Asia 
      (including China) 28.8 32.7 41.2
Table 1: Savings as a Ratio to GDP (%)
ure had increased by over ten-fold to $ 8,539 (in constant prices). 
Between 1981 and 2005, China managed to lift almost 630 million 
people out of poverty (according to the World Bank’s $ 1.25 per 
day international measure). Thus, its incidence of poverty plum-
meted during this period from about 84% of the total population to 
about 16%.
China’s choice of development model has historical roots in the 
success of the earlier East Asian Tigers and, before that, Japan. 
Choosing this option has also been deeply influenced by the trau-
matic experiences of the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997-1998. 
Adopting an export-oriented growth strategy relies critically on 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate. Hence, managing the 
exchange rate—such as through a ‘soft peg’—makes sense. Not 
surprisingly, exchange-rate management is widespread among de-
veloping countries. Nonetheless, a country needs to have amassed 
a sizeable and diversified stock of foreign-exchange reserves in 
order to have success in such a strategy. And it must also be able to 
sterilize any domestic monetary impact of such reserves.
The countries in Asia that had earlier liberalized their trade and 
capital flows learned some bitter lessons from the Asia Financial 
Crisis. One was that they must avoid, at all costs, running current-
account deficits, especially if such deficits are financed by short-
term external borrowing. 
One after the other, these countries confronted speculative attacks 
on their currencies when they had difficulties in servicing their ex-
ternal loans. Reluctantly, many had to turn to the IMF to bail them 
out of their financial crises. They thus suffered from the humilia-
tion of being compelled to comply with a lengthy and onerous list 
of restrictive IMF conditionalities.
Once recovered from the crisis, these countries began a concerted 
effort to consistently run current-account surpluses, and started ac-
cumulating foreign-exchange reserves as insurance against specu-
lative attacks on their currencies. Although China had escaped the 
worst consequences of the Asia Financial Crisis, it had learned 
nonetheless some of the major lessons from that experience.
Current Accounts and Reserves
Between 2004 and 2007, East Asia’s current-account surplus 
rose from about $ 132 billion to about $ 436 billion (ADB 2009). 
China’s surplus (e.g., about $ 372 billion in 2007) dominated this 
aggregate, although Hong Kong, China and Taiwan POC also 
consistently contributed surpluses. By 2007 China’s stock of gross 
international reserves had reached over $ 1.5 trillion, and was 
still increasing. The combined reserves of Hong Kong, China and 
Taiwan POC had reached about $ 423 billion in 2007.
Between 2004 and 2007, Southeast Asia’s current-account surplus 
also rose, from about $ 42 billion to about $ 98 billion. This re-
flected mainly the contributions of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand. The combined stock of gross international reserves 
of these four countries alone had reached about $ 409 billion in 
2007.
Thus, the trends of China’s current account and international 
reserves mirror those of many of the export-oriented economies in 
East and Southeast Asia. The difference is that China’s surpluses 
and reserves have been growing particularly rapidly in recent years 
and are huge in absolute magnitude.
Though the combined current-account surpluses of Germany and 
Japan exceed those of China, few economists or politicians in the 
West are heaping blame on them for global imbalances. In 2007, 
for instance, the combined current-account surplus of Germany 
and Japan was about $ 464 billion while that of China, as men-
tioned above, was $ 372 billion.
The main difference between these advanced economies and China 
seems to be that China is realigning the global balance of eco-
nomic and political power while Germany and Japan are not. The 
latter have been running large current-account surpluses for a long 
time without having triggered significant opposition from the US 

















































Figure 1. China and US Current Account Balances, 1990-2008









Martin Wolf’s explanation is that these two advanced economies 
are ‘structurally mercantilist’ while China has ‘mercantilist poli-
cies’ (December 2, 2008 FT column). Though this distinction 
remains murky, the implication appears to be that China has a 
choice: it can allow its currency to appreciate and significantly 
reduce its surpluses. But the above distinction is a misleading char-
acterization of the underlying forces at work.
The Sources of Chinese Savings 
China’s current-account surpluses are directly related, through 
macroeconomic accounting, to ‘excess’ domestic savings—i.e., 
a surplus of domestic savings relative to domestic investment. 
Hence, it is important to examine why China has a high savings 
rate and whether it is ‘excessive’. 
As Table 2 shows, China’s gross domestic savings rate averaged 
over 52% of GDP during 2005-2007, a jump from about 41% 
during 2000-2004. This is, indeed, very high. However, China 
has been both a high-savings and a high-investment economy for 
a long time. For instance, during 2005-2007, its gross domestic 
investment rate was about 44% of GDP, while it had been close to 
40% for many years before then. Such high rates help explain the 
country’s very rapid pace of growth.
The problem is that while both China’s savings and investment 
rates have been on the rise, the gap between the two, namely, its 
‘excess savings’, has recently been widening. During 2005-2007, 
this gap had enlarged to 8.3 percentage points whereas it had been 
only 2.4 percentage points during 2000-2004. Why has this been 
the case?
China has a high domestic savings rate for several ‘structurally’ 
important reasons. The proposition that China saves ‘too much’ be-
cause of its ‘mercantilist’ exchange-rate regime is simple-minded 
and disingenuous. It is indeed true that its ‘excess savings’ are as-
sociated directly with its current account surplus. But the mechani-
cal application of macroeconomic accounting cannot substitute for 
a concrete analysis of underlying behavioural relationships.
Other important factors have been driving savings. China’s very 
rapid rates of growth have certainly boosted savings, as has been 
the case in other fast-growing economies. In recent years the 
biggest increases in national savings in China have been due not 
to rising household savings, but to the enlargement of corporate re-
tained earnings, which now account for about 60% of all savings. 
Corporate retained earnings have also been rising in the US, as 
incomes have been transferred from labour to capital, but the 
major difference is that US households have been dis-saving on a 
dramatic scale. 
Other major factors, which specifically raise Chinese precaution-
ary savings, originate in the insecurities inherent in the country’s 
transition to a more market-based economy. Such effects are 
particularly pronounced among urban households. 
For example, household expenditures on health insurance and 
education have had to rise significantly as the state has abandoned 
its earlier socialist commitments. Also, households can no longer 
rely on the security of old-age pensions, which had previously 
been tied to the employment of their members in state-owned 
enterprises (ADB 2009, pp. 91-92). Also, urban unemployment has 
been on the rise as SOEs have restructured into more commercial 
enterprises.
But households have also been able to save more because of 
declining family size. The decisive demographic impact of China’s 
long-standing one-child policy is often neglected in these discus-
sions.
Expected Changes
China’s unprecedentedly high savings rate will undoubtedly begin 
to decline. The knock-on effects of the global recession will surely 
lower corporate retained earnings as well as reduce the current-
account surplus as a result of declines in export earnings. 
Also, it appears that China started running deficits on its capital 
account in 2008 as it began to export capital to other countries, 
particularly those with substantial resource endowments. Between 
1999 and 2007, in contrast, China had run surpluses on its capital 
and financial account, powered mostly by continuous inflows of 
net direct investment that amounted to 2-4% of GDP. China’s 
recent shift to capital exports could represent a momentous change 
of its international strategy, which could significantly alter the 
global economic landscape.
In a related development, China has already begun to diversify 
out of the dead-end of US-denominated reserves and promote the 
renminbi as a medium of exchange for trade relations (such as with 
Brazil). China cannot afford to continue investing large sums in 
low-return and increasingly risky US assets.
Also, the country is implementing one of the largest fiscal stimulus 
packages in the world, estimated at about 5% of China’s GDP. This 
compares favourably to the US stimulus package, which, at 2% 
of US GDP, is much lower in relative terms. China’s stimulus—
which is concentrated in development-oriented investment—will 
certainly spill over into increases in domestic consumption and 
result in higher imports.
In summary, this Policy Brief has stressed that there are good 
reasons why China has followed its export-oriented development 
strategy and why it has a high savings rate. Its policies have been 
neither mercantilist, Machiavellian nor malign. In many ways, 
its strategy has been a remarkable development success. And its 
actions have certainly not been the motive force behind global 
imbalances.
It is worthwhile remembering that the great majority of Chinese 
are still relatively poor by developed-country standards. Despite 
having an average GDP per capita estimated to be $ 8,539 in 2008, 
this level is just a little over one fifth of the US GDP per capita of 
$ 38,277. Yet China has been exporting capital to the US to finance 
the latter’s systematically worsening excess consumption. This 
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1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2007
Gross Domestic 
Savings 41.2 42.0 41.1 52.4
Gross Capital 
Formation 39.5 38.8 38.7 44.1
Difference 
between the Two 1.7 3.2 2.4 8.3
Table 2: Investment and Savings in China, 
1990-2007 (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
latter bubble obviously reached its limits.
During the current crisis, the US household sector is rehabilitating 
its savings, banks are rebuilding their balance sheets and the cor-
porate sector is refraining from investing. Meanwhile, persistently 
large US current account deficits exert a heavy drag on aggregate 
demand. Hence, running historically large fiscal deficits, backed by 
monetary stimulus, has had to become the main source of aggre-
gate demand for US economic recovery. 
However, such a stimulus package remains inadequate to the task 
at hand, and could eventually generate counter-productive effects. 
Eventually, the fiscal deficits will have to be reduced. More impor-
tant in the medium term is achieving a slowdown in household and 
corporate debt. 
But most critical in the longer term would be US success in 
regaining international competitiveness. Otherwise, its employ-
ment would remain heavily reliant on domestic credit expansion 
and ballooning budget deficits, and on the continuing infusion of 
other countries’ savings to finance a seemingly intractable current 
account deficit. 
The recent clamour in the West about China’s so-called ‘exchange-
rate manipulation’ only serves to mask the underlying reality that 
the US has lost its previous edge in international competitiveness. 
A sharp depreciation of the US dollar—which would have, in 
any case, a deleterious impact on the global economy—could not 
solve, by itself, this fundamental problem.
References:
Asian Development Bank (2009). Asian Development Outlook 2009: 
Rebalancing Asia’s Growth, Manila: ADB.
Izurieta, Alex and Terry McKinley (2006). “Addressing Global Imbal-
ances: A Development-Oriented Policy Agenda”. Working Paper #23, 
International Poverty Centre, Brasilia, July. 
http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper23.pdf.
McKinley, Terry (2006). “The Monopoly of Global Capital Flows: 
Who Needs Structural Adjustment Now?”  Working Paper #12, Inter-
national Poverty Centre, Brasilia, March. 
http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper12.pdf.
Wolf, Martin (2009). Fixing Global Finance: How to Curb Financial 
Crises in the 21st Century. London: Yale University Press.
5
inequitable transfer of resources is already in the process of being 
corrected, thanks in part to the global recession.
The Drivers of US Consumption 
Despite many eminent opinions to the contrary, this Policy Brief 
has argued that the US should be regarded as the central source 
and the ‘driving force’ of the current exacerbated state of global 
imbalances. Trying to shift the blame onto China serves only to 
cloud this reality. The main global focus now should be on how 
US structural adjustment, set within the context of a global reces-
sion, could be carried out to reduce the basis for future global 
imbalances.
Knowing how the US originally got into crisis would help us 
understand how it could attempt now to extricate itself. So, what 
were the domestic ‘drivers’ of the US ‘over-consumption’ binge? 
We bring this Policy Brief to a close with such a discussion.
Because the US began to run sizeable current-account deficits 
in the early 1990s and the Clinton administration began in the 
1990s to substantially reduce the large fiscal deficit inherited from 
the Reagan era, the private sector had to supply the compensat-
ing aggregate demand to sustain economic growth (see Izurieta 
and McKinley 2006 for an analysis of the roots of impending US 
crisis). 
As the corporate sector oscillated between small surpluses and 
small deficits, the household sector began spending well beyond 
its level of income. As a result, the net savings of the household 
sector declined from a surplus of well over 3% of GNP in the early 
1990s to a deficit of about -4% of GNP by the turn of the century. 
Households were increasingly borrowing to sustain higher levels 
of consumption and residential investment (Izurieta and McKinley 
2006).
Why did US households feel confident about borrowing so heav-
ily? Their personal assets, such as equities and housing stock, 
were also rapidly appreciating. As long as asset appreciation kept 
pace with the rise of household liabilities, continuing increases in 
household consumption appeared sustainable.
But, as we now know, the stock-market bubble burst in 2001. The 
US Government was initially able to contain the shock through 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. One important conse-
quence was that interest rates remained historically low. But this 
policy stance had the undesirable side-effect of further fuelling the 
real-estate bubble. By 2007-2008, the continued inflating of this 
